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| Sri Lankan ethnic Tamil man shows his inked finger after casting vote ( AP photo) |
DAYAN JAYATILLEKA
The TNA victory has shown that Sri Lanka remains a functioning
democracy; that it functions when there is competition; and that with or without
the 17th amendment and even under the tightest military supervision, the
government can be electorally defeated.
Having won the war, the Government has lost the
peace in the North (and earlier, parts of the East), while it continues to lead
impressively in post-war politics in the more populous two- thirds of the
island.
The TNA’s electoral tsunami has many dimensions
and implications. The UNP’s meltdown is a far simpler matter. The TNA’s sweep
denotes the resounding political and ideological defeat of the Government’s
model of post war rule in the North. Paradoxically, the sweep was also possible
because a war was fought to a finish against the Tigers, without which the
democratic space would not have re-opened, elections could not have been held
and the TNA candidates would have in all probability been assassinated.
When the post-revolutionary Sandinista
government lost power in 1990, having won in 1984, it was said by analysts that
the very fact that power could be transferred openly and peacefully to the
Opposition for the first time in Nicaragua’s modern history, was itself a
victory for the Nicaraguan Revolution. Similarly, the very holding of a Northern
provincial council election in a peaceful and relatively free and fair manner,
is a by-product of the war and the defeat of the Tigers by the Sri Lankan
government, state and the armed forces.
It is true that the holding of the elections
was due to external pressure and blandishments by India and Japan respectively.
However, India itself could not hold an election in the North in 1988 and had to
cobble together a joint slate. The first North-East provincial council was
constituted through en election in only one province, the East. It was the
decimation of the Tigers as a military force by the Mahinda Rajapaksa
administration that made the restoration of a competitive electoral process
possible.
Thus the political picture in the
overwhelmingly Tamil North is almost exactly what it was before the war. The
clock has been put back many decades to the dominance of the Federal party or
ITAK. However the degree of political dominance of the TNA is far higher than it
ever was for the pre-war ITAK because of (i) the convergence that the TNA
represents (ii) the elimination of many political currents by the LTTE’s policy
of slaughter (one can only imagine an election in which the undiminished EPRLF,
PLOT and TELO contested) and (iii) the unenlightened post-war model of rule
installed by the regime.
So what of the morning after? The government
and the TNA have to recognise the political reality unflinchingly. What is that
reality? It is that both the North and South are politically and ideologically
uni-polar. Tamil nationalism is here to stay and dominates the mood of the
North, while Sinhala nationalism or more correctly populist nationalism
dominates the South and is as durable. The Government’s model of rule has lost
some considerable legitimacy in the North and has to change. The flip side is
that the TNA and the Tamils in general have to grasp that the Rajapaksa
administration and more especially President Rajapaksa himself (the campaign in
the South was carried by a re-energised Mahinda Rajapaksa) is the only game in
town for the foreseeable future.
The TNA and the Government must find a
modus-vivendi, a way to co-exist. The government must not place the TNA
administration under siege and must instead try to help it evolve in a more
constructive and moderate direction, softening it up rather than permitting
radicalism and political militancy to influence it from within and without. The
Government must recognise that the shift in the centre of gravity of Tamil
politics from the Diaspora and Tamil Nadu to the TNA and the Northern Council is
a positive thing. The government must also realise that the best deal available
is that which can be cut with the TNA and that behind and beyond the TNA lie the
weight of 80 million Tamils as well as the influence they carry in India and the
West.
The TNA for its part must understand that its
main interlocutor is in Colombo; that the Northern Council must not be seen as a
beachhead for pan-Tamil nationalist politics, least of all of a secessionist
project. The TNA must not regard itself or the Council as equal negotiating
partners in a bilateral discussion between two countries, or one country and
another in waiting. The realities of the government’s – and more especially the
President’s --undiminished popularity in the vastly more populous two thirds of
the island as well as the strength and presence of the armed forces – which, in
a heightened perception of threat can always be expanded up to the 300,000 mark
which Gen Fonseka had argued for and Mahinda Rajapaksa had turned down in the
immediate aftermath of the war.
The Northern vote has politically and
psychologically altered the post-war balance. It has re-empowered the Tamils.
This is a therapeutic and almost inevitable re-balancing. The Government must
recognise and respect the new equilibrium. However, the Tamil side must
understand that none of this means that the massive historical reality of a
decisive military defeat in a protracted war has been reversed. In terms of
power, that victory remains and constitutes the dominant reality.
The pro-Prabhakaran, pro-Tiger political
rhetoric that marked and marred the TNA’s electoral campaign imposes limits on
the possible. It has re-awakened memories and provided a glimpse into the
project of pan-Tamil nationalist politics and the Tamil nationalist mindset. No
state can be unaffected by this revelation. The invocation of Prabhakaran’s
ghost has a real-world political price tag. No leader whose popularity and
legitimacy derives not only from his manifest appeal among the Sinhalese
majority but his achievement in defeating the Tigers, is going to kiss and make
up with the TNA on the morning after. A chill will have set in between Jaffna
and Colombo; South and North.
At this stage of history, no political
discussion can involve the transcendence of the 13th amendment. All effort has
to be on the implementation of the amendment. The absence of trust probably
means that this implementation will be graduated. Having proved its electoral
strength the TNA must not try to fast track the macro-political process which
will prove even more contentious after the political ‘holographic projection’ of
Prabhakaran than it was before. There is much to be done in the form of
consolidation and development at the local level, within the space available. If
that space is under siege the effort must be to stretch it to its constitutional
limit and not beyond. There are two modes that present themselves before the TNA
in a politico-existential choice. One is the ‘capillary’ or ‘molecular’ mode of
evolutionary change through gradualism and incrementalism. The other is that of
nationalist take-off, fuelled by hyper-inflationary rhetoric.
The government has two choices as well: a Cold
war and an institutional siege of the Northern PC or a lucidly Realist
combination of constructive engagement and containment. The government must
recognise that the newly elected Council has great legitimacy externally.
Both the government and the TNA have to build
bridges to each other. Both have also to discern the red lines. If the
government seeks to dismantle the 13th amendment, it will cross a red-line drawn
by India and the West. While the TNA’s discourse is its own business (just as
anyone’s dreams are their own), if it tries to translate it into political
action and push for ‘the right of self determination’ (qualified as ‘internal’
as Anton Balasingham used to), federalism or the transfer of powers beyond the
13th amendment, it will cross a red-line drawn by the Sri Lankan state, the
Sinhala people and the armed forces. The South resisted the PTOMS and the ISGA
proposals when its collective back was to the wall. It will not countenance any
attempt on the part of the TNA to conduct itself as if the Northern PC were the
ISGA or the PTOMS.
The Sri Lankan state contained Tamil
nationalism by defeating the Tigers and is in turn, now politically contained by
the international order as well as the Tamil political resurgence. The
international community and most especially India must be aware that both
Sinhala and Tamil nationalism must be contained. A perceived tilt of the world
system towards the Sri Lankan state has now been corrected, but the external
players must not encourage a perception of a tilt to Tamil nationalism which has
not succeed in kicking the secessionist temptation.
However strong the pan-Tamil cause is
externally and whatever external pressures may be brought to bear, the vote for
the UPFA and for Fonseka’s DP reveals enough of a support base for protracted
military resistance, with or without Mahinda Rajapaksa, to any roll-back of the
verdict of May 2009. This collective emotion which is no less tenacious than
that of the Tamils and has an enormous demographic advantage on the ground is
also a reality and must be recognised if Sri Lanka is not to become another
Egypt or Syria someday (with an important difference—the Sri Lankan armed forces
aren’t secular; they are the Buddhist Brotherhood).
The vote in the far less strategically
significant but far more populous North Western and Central provinces present a
clear and less complex picture. The popularity of the UPFA-- read Mahinda
Rajapaksa—hovers around 60% while that of the main democratic Opposition as led
by Ranil Wickremesinghe averages out in the high 20% range, failing to cross
30%. The TNA and the international community must know that it is only Mahinda
Rajapaksa who can deliver anything like peaceful coexistence between North and
South, between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Any alternative will come from within
the system, will be backed by the military and be far more hawkish.
At a Presidential election which is a
popularity contest between Mahinda and Ranil, the figure for the incumbent may
rise while that of the challenger/competitor/the other guy will drop below the
percentage obtained at these provincial elections, not least because every
defeat has a knock-on effect. The spectre of a Chandrika comeback or proxy
candidacy of her son is rendered silly because the 35%-40% gap between Mahinda
and Ranil cannot be bridged or significantly affected by any such aspirant
spoiler.
The emergence of General Fonseka’s Democratic
Party as the third force in the South i.e. among the Sinhalese, shows that the
last war remains the source of legitimacy and conversely illegitimacy among the
Sinhalese (with Ranil being de-legitimised by definition). It also shows the
ideological direction in which discontent and dissent are flowing---towards a
leadership which is rooted in the military victory of 2009 and represents a
tougher minded Rajapaksa-ist nationalism without the family factor. This
indicates the kind of leader and candidate the UNP must pick and the direction
in which the party must shift. It must pick a new leader before this year is out
if it is not to lose more votes to the UPFA and the DP. It is an imperative to
avoid irrevocable electoral extinction and the resultant long duration
degeneration of Sri Lanka from democracy to something else.
