One
of the saddest aspects of the last three years has been the corrosive
distrust between all political players. This is almost relentlessly
exacerbated by several factors. The first, and perhaps the most
worrying, is what I term a failure of rationalism, the practice of
judging situations not in terms of evidence but rather through emotions.
This contributes to a tendency to interpret ambiguities in line with
fears rather than hopes.
Then there are what might be termed
political factors. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the tendency of
extremists on all sides to act and speak in a manner that worries those
on the other side or sides. The second factor here is the failure of
moderates on all sides, who I believe constitute the majority, to rein
back their extremists. Combined with this is the tendency of a few of
these last to adopt the rhetoric of the extremists so as to keep on the
good side of what they believe might become the support base of the
latter.
Associated with these are psychological
factors. Thus there is a tendency to expect the other sides to control
their extremists, whilst expecting them conversely to understand the
compulsions that lead one to excuse and even perhaps condone one’s own
extremists. And linked to these are supposed strategic factors, most
obviously in terms of the belief that others are not sincere in their
negotiating positions, and therefore one must demand much more than one
really needs, in order to end up with an acceptable via media.
Negotiations shuold over come fears of others
I should add
to this last something I feel contributes to disaster in many
negotiations, and not only in this country, namely the assumption that
one negotiates to get what one wants. On the contrary, I believe that
negotiations should be based on trying to ensure that the fears of
others are overcome, ie that they get what it takes to reassure them
with regard to what has upset them in the past. While it may not be
possible to illustrate the various points I have made above with
discussion of the behavior of individuals, since what might seem
criticism will contribute, given past practice, to a hardening of
positions, I can from a positive perspective note that the one period of
progress during talks between the government and the TNA occurred when
fears to be assuaged were considered rather than advantages to be
gained. I believe we were on the verge of a generally acceptable
solution to the question of land when other factors brought the talks to
a grinding halt.
But this brings me to a final destructive
factor, which may seem insignificant but which I think plays a large
role in Sri Lankan politics. This is the need to win favour, which it
seems is achieved more swiftly by criticizing others rather than by
productive work. In the case of our negotiations with the TNA, I found
that it was regularly being suggested that I was the TNA representative
on the government side. What began as a jest, as I thought, was repeated
so often that I fear it began to gain credence in some quarters. This
may have contributed to my not being invited to some meetings, so that I
felt I served no useful purpose by continuing on the team.
The talks, it will be noted, broke down just when the Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission was
issued. That was immediately tabled in Parliament with a very positive
speech from the Leader of the House. In general the Report was well
received by most stakeholders, including what is termed the
international community. However there were three comparatively adverse
blasts, which seemed to bring together the stranger elements of the
coalition that had supported the supposed common opposition candidate
Fonseka during the Presidential Election of 2010. This included the TNA,
which may have had good reason for its performances in both these
particulars, but they were not calculated to win confidence. Indeed I
recall at the time, when we were trying to proceed with negotiations,
the Leader of the House telling me that he hoped the President had not
seen the TNA statement on the LLRC Report.
LLRC and Govt position
But of course there would have been
enough and more people who would have brought that statement to the
President’s attention. More significantly, it led to those within
government who did not like the LLRC Report, but who had kept silent
previously, coming out with harsh critiques from the other side. This
led to people believing that the government position on the LLRC was
ambiguous, whereas it should have been obvious, with a little bit of
rational thought, that the Leader of the House would not have tabled the
Report so promptly with a very positive statement had he not been
instructed to do so by the President.
I recall just before that an ambassador
telling me that the government’s position was not clear, and I suggested
that what should be considered was, not the pronouncements of
individuals, but the speeches of those mandated to speak to the
international community. The answer was that the people I mentioned had
lost credibility completely, a position mentioned also to someone else
by a much more tactful ambassador, which brought home to me, not the
mala fides of those who had been named, but rather the impossible
position in which they found themselves in the context of so many
players making so many noises for so many reasons. Your heart may be in
the right place, but it is easy to wilt like a wallflower when
confronted by the aggression of the determined, whether international
interventionists or national negators.
Despite the clear statement then of the
Leader of the House, not one of those I hasten to add who had roused the
distrust I mentioned, for his mandate is profoundly national, the next
month saw see-sawing, with both sides it seemed trying to demand much
more or much less than the LLRC, instead of working without deviance
towards ensuring that it was taken forward. In this instance, though I
think they were wrong, I can understand the perspective of those in
government who attacked the LLRC Report, because they may well have
thought that the Coalition of the Devious wanted the LLRC Report
recommendations carried out, and then much, much more – so by standing
firm against it, they might reach equilibrium.
Meanwhile the President had asked for a
Road-map for fulfillment of the Recommendations but this was not
prepared expeditiously. It is possible that those entrusted with the job
thought they should delay, given the controversy that had arisen, as
they believed, within government ranks, with the more vociferous
critical of the LLRC. But it is also possible that it was simply
lethargy that prevented the work. The President certainly thought the
work was being done, and even suggested that the Road-map be taken to
Geneva, but was persuaded that it should be kept confidential. One of
those entrusted with the Road-map told me that it was indeed being
prepared, but I should ask the Minister if I wanted to see it, and the
Minister simply said, ‘What Road-map?’
I
realized then that the same thing was happening as had occurred with
the Interim Recommendations, which the President absolutely believed
were being implemented as he had instructed. He referred me to the
Inter-Ministerial Committee appointed for the purpose, and was
astonished when I told him that Committee had not met after it was set
up. He wanted me put on the Committee and asked that I be given the
documentation, but it turned out there were no minutes. I was not put on
the Committee on the grounds that I was a Parliamentarian, though I
suspect that it was because I can be a bloody nuisance, as I was
described when appointed to convene the Task Force on implementation of
the Human Rights Action Plan, ie someone who demands meetings and action, even if I do not always succeed in ensuring rapid progress.
The President did appoint me to monitor
the work of the Committee, and it took much badgering before I was
finally told that the Committee did not meet. However I had been given
reports on progress, and it should be noted that this was substantial in
many areas. But the failure to ensure meetings of relevant stakeholders
and systematic records meant that progress was not well enough known,
and also that there was insufficient attention to areas in which
progress was limited. With regard to the Human Rights Action Plan,
I have realized that many problems are caused, even when there are
positive attitudes, by the proliferation of agencies involved, and one
must ensure coordination through regular consultation to ensure
progress.
Interim Recommendations
The reason for systemic failure with
regard to the Interim Recommendations was I think political, or rather
the perception that political agendas had to be kept in mind, whereas to
my mind what was needed was simply administrative efficiency, since the objectives had been agreed. The LLRC had made recommendations, and the President had wanted these implemented.
If it turned out that some recommendations could not be implemented
readily, then the reasons for this could be recorded and alternatives
devised to meet the desired objectives. But unless there is regular
consultation, with a team dedicated to implementation, the desired goals
can be lost sight of.
So I am immeasurably heartened by the
recent report, in the most outspoken of our papers last Sunday, that a
team of bureaucrats has been put together by the President’s Secretary
who has been entrusted with implementation of the Recommendations. While
one cannot altogether avoid politics playing a part, the two
bureaucrats who have been the mainstay of the Human Rights Action Plan
Task Force, the current Secretary to the Ministry of Justice and her
most distinguished predecessor, are emphatically technocrats with no
obligations except to the task before them. The latter also had a stint
as Secretary to the Ministry of Policy and Plan Implementation, and
devised an excellent monitoring mechanism for projects which Ministries
were just getting used to reporting on systematically when the Ministry
was abolished. Sadly the excellent paper she had prepared to suggest
even more accountability was not taken into account, when it was decided
to abolish that Ministry, along with the Human Rights Ministry.
The reporting matrix she prepared for the Human Rights Action Plan has
been replicated, according to an interview by one of our best
journalists with another member of the team, which appeared in another
Sunday paper, with even greater attention to detail. Though not
specified, it would seem that responsible agencies for each
recommendation will be identified, and required to ‘agree on a time
frame for its implementation and invite all stakeholders to comment on
the proposals.’ The third bureaucrat on the team, I should note, was
one of the most impressive of my colleagues when I worked at the
Ministry of Education some years back, during its most innovative
period. It is heartening that his talents are now being used in a field
where precision and energy are essential to make a difference.
The interview breaks down the
recommendations roughly in the manner that the excellent paper prepared
by the Marga Institute did when the LLRC Report was first published.
These are parallel to the areas for action identified in the Draft National Policy on Reconciliation prepared
in my office which involved a small but extremely thoughtful group
representing a range of interests. All such analyses stress the
importance of what we termed restoration work, but have added on what we
identified many years ago at the Peace Secretariat as psycho-social
needs, which have not been addressed adequately in the last few years,
when physical needs were met with remarkable efficiency. We also
stressed the need for practical solutions with regard to restitution,
and something again raised by the Peace Secretariat nearly five years
ago, the need for clarification with regard to land issues, is now I
gather finally being resolved, with activation of the proposals the Law
Commission sensibly prepared some time back.
In these areas I do not anticipate many
difficulties, though we do need greater attention to detail and more
systematic records. At the Divisional Secretariat Reconciliation
Committees that are now functioning in the Wanni, we have suggested
regular meetings for Livelihood and Protection, with careful collation
of all interventions and their outcomes, so as to identify those who
still need support. Though much has been done, some people have fallen
through the net, and checking on this with mechanisms to institute
transparent principles for further assistance will help not only with
livelihood, but also with the attitudinal changes that are so important
for Reconciliation. Recognition of the role of the community in
repairing the damage of the past is essential.
I
should add that, for expeditious and efficacious action, we need to
think outside the box, which I have no doubt the public servants I have
mentioned will do superbly. In education, for instance, we have very
swiftly restored infrastructure but we must do more to promote
socialization and better opportunities in areas that were neglected in
the past. At the Reconciliation Committees, we have suggested also
Committees for Social and Cultural activities at Grama Niladhari level,
to promote extra-curricular activities and a more rounded education for
students that will also develop soft skills to help with employment.
Alternate systems of teacher training, to facilitate local personnel
getting employment, and therefore being more likely to stay on in remote
areas, should also be developed.
And much more sophisticated systems of
vocational training are needed, with better provision of soft skills, so
that these youngsters do not simply feed the labour market, but have
the opportunity to become entrepreneurs. I was impressed when, at a
recent meeting, while recognizing the abundance of the harvests
following resettlement, a representative of a Women’s Rural Development
Society asked for training in Marketing. We cannot permit the area to be
once more a source of profits for outsiders, but should instead ensure
that the processing and value addition that we must concentrate on at
this stage of our development is, as much as possible, the preserve of
locals.
All this will not be difficult if proper
planning and monitoring is put in place. What will require more subtle
skills is the political settlement that needs to be put in place to
overcome fears arising from the majoritarian measures of the past. If
however we bear two principles in mind, firstly that it is worries
that must be assuaged, not ambitions that must be fulfilled, and
secondly that the purpose of political reform should be to ensure
governance that empowers and is responsive to the people,
we should be able to move swiftly. Given that separatism is still
feared, and sadly still sought by those who funded the LTTE, we need to
ensure that security in all aspects remains the responsibility of the
Centre, albeit with institutionalized mechanisms to ensure the
involvement of the periphery in decision making. Since all parties are
agreed on the need for a Senate, with equal weight for each Province, we
should proceed swiftly with setting this up, with powers to prevent
hasty legislation without proper assessment and consultation.
Conversely, the empowerment of local
communities in areas where the Centre has failed signally to deliver can
proceed apace, given the general agreement that responsible and
accountable local government systems must be established. The principle
of subsidiarity, allowing decisions to be made at the smallest possible
level that is relevant, should be the basis for political reform,
bearing in mind the need for policy formulation that prevents
discriminatory measures in any context.
Accountability
The second area which may cause problems,
but should not, is that of what is termed accountability. Wild
accusations are made about the conduct of the Sri Lankan forces, and
these should be rebutted systematically, using the material on record,
in particular documentation by the responsible sections of the UN and
the ICRC. These have been ignored, by those who react with general
opposition to what they see as international interference, as well as by
those who think such interference should be treated as sacrosanct. I
have pointed out previously for instance how we in effect ignored the
first US intervention in this regard, the State Department report of
2009 which was balanced and provided material to rebut the wilder
allegations – and therefore left ourselves open to the more perverse
performance illustrated by the Wikileaks account of how recourse was had to shady operators such as Guy Rhodes, to pile up evidence against us.
I can understand the anger of those who
believe the United States is being outrageously hypocritical as it
merrily executes extra-judicially anyone it suspects of terrorism, along
with all their cousins and their aunts, but that is no reason not to
put our own house in order. We should in 2009 have laid out what really
happened, not least because it was indeed a model performance, and we
had every right to expect others to study the campaign and learn from
it.
At the same time, we should have
investigated and dealt with the one area of the five held against us in
the Darusman Report in which, as the LLRC report makes clear, there
seemed to be a prima facie case of abuse. The ham fisted way in which we
dealt with the Sarath Fonseka accusation, accusing him of being a
traitor, instead of proving that he was lying by reference to his
earlier account of the event, was symptomatic of thinking of short term
gains rather than the larger picture.
Related to this of course is the need to
make sure that Human Rights are better protected. While exceptional
measures, as authorized under Emergency Regulations, were understandable
when we were in grave danger, we should have abandoned recourse to them
as well as the Regulations soon afterwards. Even though I can
understand security concerns, given the determination of some elements
in the diaspora and those they fund to go back at some point to
terrorism, we should register the fact that the danger is less and work
towards eliminating support for terrorism within Sri Lanka, without
reacting nervously when the Tigers, and their jackals as Richard de
Zoysa might have put it, roar and howl in the wider world.
We did a great job in Rehabilitation of former cadres (though
as I have noted, there should have been more systematic programmes for
reintegration, either through the Bureau or through a clearly mandated
Rehabilitation Authority), which was based on the determination to trust
our own people who had been forced into terrorism by threats as well as
deprivation. Such trust should have informed our whole approach to
possible terrorist threats. The excessive demonization we see elsewhere,
with the assumption that all males could be terrorists, is not a
pattern to follow. We are dealing with fellow Sri Lankans, and the
rhetoric of wars against terror in other places should not govern our
approach. We have overcome the Tigers here, and we must think of
everyone in this country now as full partners. In the social, economic
and political empowerment we all deserve after our long ordeal.
