This is a tad confusing, since the US Ambassador at the time, going by this cable, did not seem to share the defence attache’s suspicion that the offers of surrender were ” a bit suspect anyway, and they tended to vary in content hour by hour, day by day.”The on-going ‘Defeating Terrorism: The Sri Lankan Experience‘ seminar is providing much food for thought. The Global Context of Counterterrorism: Strategy, Ethics, and Sustainability in Sri Lanka’s COIN Experience by Dr. David Kilcullen published on this site is based on a speech delivered at this seminar. The proceedings are webcast live (though our experience is that the webcast only works on the Windows platform and not on OS X or Linux, and is rather poor in terms of quality) with key presentations archived on YouTube here.
We were sent today the brief submission of the US Defence Attache’s observations on the end of war in Sri Lanka, recorded from what must have been one of the Q&A or discussion sessions today.
What he says is,
“Hello, may I say something to a couple of the questions raised. I’ve been the defence attache here at the US Embassy since June of 2008. Regarding the various versions of events that came out in the final hours and days of the conflict – from what I was privileged to hear and to see, the offers to surrender that I am aware of seemed to come from the mouthpieces of the LTTE – Nadesan, KP – people who weren’t and never had really demonstrated any control over the leadership or the combat power of the LTTE. So their offers were a bit suspect anyway, and they tended to vary in content hour by hour, day by day. I think we need to examine the credibility of those offers before we leap to conclusions that such offers were in fact real.
And I think the same is true for the version of events. It’s not so uncommon in combat operations, in the fog of war, as we all get our reports second, third and fourth hand from various Commanders at various levels that the stories don’t seem to all quite match up. But I can say that the version presented here so far in this is what I heard as I was here during that time.
And I think I better leave it at that before I get into trouble.”
The defence attache’s observations are interesting in light of the US Embassy’s situation report (#74) of 17 May 2009, which we now know courtesy Assange. As mentioned in Afterposten, which published this cable,
“3. (C) Ambassador spoke to Gothabaya Rajapaksa (sic) on the morning of May 17 to urge him to allow the ICRC into the conflict zone to mediate a surrender.”
This is a tad confusing, since the US Ambassador at the time, going by this cable, did not seem to share the defence attache’s suspicion that the offers of surrender were ” a bit suspect anyway, and they tended to vary in content hour by hour, day by day.”
We can’t help but recall Alice in Wonderland, and note that this is all getting “curiouser and curiouser!”
GV
