Sunday, July 20, 2014

Sri Lanka's Administrative Service is in the doldrums

The Public Service Omission, Editorial, The Sunday Times
Details contained in the report of the Public Service Commission — the body responsible for the disciplinary conduct of public servants or now known as government servants — are published in this issue on Page 4 today.Set up during the pre-Independence era, today’s Sri Lanka Administrative Service was formerly known as the Ceylon Civil Service.
The Public Service Commission (PSC) was then the insurance public officials had against politicians. The CCS officials were accused of being mere pen-pushers who held ARs (Administrative Regulations) and FRs (Financial Regulations) as their ‘Bible’, but no one could deny they were a highly respected lot.

Their status and complexion gradually changed as time went by. In the 1960s, for the first time, a person from outside this elite circle of trained administrators was made Permanent Secretary of a Ministry. It opened the door for ‘outsiders’ and political appointees to take charge of the administration of ministries. Today we have businessmen who are fully involved in running their businesses and funding politicians, as secretaries of Ministries. That is how one chink in the armour 30 years ago can dent an entire body suit.

That the country’s Administrative Service is in the doldrums and that its members are no longer the servants of the public but of the ruling party is not just the general impression of the public, but sadly, a stark fact. If the rot began with that single appointment, the 1972 Republican Constitution brought the entire service — and the PSC — under the direction of the Cabinet of Ministers. ‘What you can do badly; we can do worse’ seems to have been the motto of that Government. In 1978 the PSC came under the newly created Executive President.

In 2001 however, the 17th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution tried to reverse the downward spiral. Amidst a public outcry against the increasing politicisation of the public service, this amendment tried to put some spine back into it by placing the PSC under an independent autonomous Constitutional Council. That move was short-lived as the 18th Amendment (18A) buried the 17th Amendment (17A) concept of an independent PSC and re-introduced a PSC that was wholly appointed by the Executive President.

The PSC members do not seem to think that theirs is a role any different in ensuring a “dedicated Public Service for the nation’s excellence” as they themselves refer to their vision. Their mission they say is “to establish and promote an efficient, disciplined and contented Public Service to serve the public with fairness, transparency and consistency”.

They argue that neither Parliament nor the media could challenge their independence even if appointed under the 18A and add for good measure “there was not a single case in point in this regard with substantial evidence”. They go further. In their report they say that the silence on the part of the media to criticise the PSC can be taken as a compliment to their work. They are, no doubt, entitled to pat themselves on the back, but one might ask them if they only subscribe to the state media.

To reinforce their argument they point to a singular case (though this is not mentioned in their report) where they decided against the wife of a Cabinet Minister being appointed to a high government post and add that the Supreme Court held with their decision. They say that the Attorney General’s Department even refused to appear for them in this matter and they had to retain private lawyers.

There are some home-truths about the Public Service in their report worthy of highlighting. They refer to the “low ebb” at which Government Departments and Ministries have knowledge of disciplinary procedures and the management of disciplinary matters. They say that carrying out disciplinary action has often been put on hold because of delays on the part of these government agencies in tendering observations, recommendations and incomplete reporting. “The ultimate outcome is the postponement of the final decision,” the PSC report states.

In the olden- golden days of the Public Service, no department or ministry would dare dilly-dally on a PSC communication. Does the callousness shown today to a directive from the PSC showcase the lack of seriousness it is taken with by the Public Service itself. In one instance, the report refers to a news item in a daily newspaper (somewhat contradicting its earlier claim) over the delay in implementing an amended Service Minute of the Government Medical Service and says that the minute was “lying idle” in a tray at the Health Ministry. It berates the secretary of the same ministry for vacillating in publishing a Government decision in the Gazette. This nearly led to a strike by the GMOA (Government Medical Officers’ Association). Again, all this was after the media highlighted the matter.

If the public service itself does not take the PSC seriously, the fact of the matter is that under the 18A, neither does it command the trust and respect of the public. If one may take a recent random case as an example, the traffic policeman who resigned from his job over an altercation with a deputy minister did not think it fit to go to the National Police Commission or the PSC. Why, because he has to go to either of them via his own department, and he had lost confidence in the Police Department, which is totally politicised.

Furthermore, the PSC has no investigative powers. It can only rely, and act on, reports forwarded to it through the respective departments and ministries. There is no provision for it to undertake independent inquiries. This is a huge lacuna. It is akin to the Bribery and Corruption Commission that says it cannot investigate anything relating to either bribery or corruption unless there is a formal complaint made to it. At least it can investigate after that. Not so the PSC.

A new team, with some old faces, has now been appointed to the PSC. The outgoing members concede that they have been subjected to political interference from time to time, but insist that they have not been influenced by it. It is almost too good to be true.  This is the National PSC. The Provincial PSC established under the 13A is another story; though not so different. There, the Governor – who is an appointee of the President — names the members of the Commission. To shake off the public distrust in Commissions that are appointed by an Executive President and serve at his will and pleasure, is, though, easier said than done.
ST