Protest at Marina Beach in Chennai ( TamilNet) |
Kusal Perera
The Resolution by the
US, supported by the EU and just 02 countries – India and South Korea – out of
13 in the Asian bloc voting in favour at the UNHRC sessions in Geneva brought
to an end, the much hyped issue of “war crimes” accusations against the
Rajapaksa regime, some in the Tamil Diaspora and most in Tamil Nadu (TN) were
very vociferous about. Adopted with 25 votes, the resolution has a procedural
binding on the SL government and it is now left to be seen, what outcome this
would have, in favour of war victims.
Slogans carried by TN
student agitations and protests were very much distant from what the Geneva
UNHRC sessions and resolution were about. These student agitations were triggered
by small extremist groups and the stance taken by the two main political rivals
in TN, each trying to outdo the other. This led the two iconic leaders to
compromise with extremist groups that have no political responsibility to what
they agitate on. This irresponsibility was very apparent by physical attacks
against Sri Lankan pilgrims going through Chennai and attacks on Sri Lankan
institutes in Chennai. Worst were mainstream political parties and human rights
groups and activists, who dodged condemning these goon attacks, thinking they
would lose ground in Tamil Nadu.
That defeatist
attitude of most such human rights activists was displayed by my good friend
Pon Chandran from Chennai, who laments writing to CT, the international
community is not responding to the
“JUST” voice of the Tamil students. He is writing about those students in Tamil
Nadu, who do not know the “A.B.C of Tamil politics in SL”. Therefore, these
“riffraff” in political agitations think it is necessary to back the appeal for
the demand to end “genocide against Tamils in SL through a UN sponsored
Referendum” to establish a “Tamil Eelam”.
This writer tried to
engage TN human rights and Tamil activists including Pon Chandran, on this
issue of a “referendum for a separate Tamil State” in North-East Sri Lanka, as
requested by Tamils for Obama in the US, now shouldered by TN fringe groups,
compromised by even opportunists like Karunanidhi. Following are excerpts from
that essay titled “Referendum Call for 'Thamil Eezham'; Could It Serve SL
Tamils in Sri Lanka ?”, circulated among TN, Bangalore and New Delhi
contacts in the human rights and civil liberty groups.
Excerpts from essay
-
This paper is an
attempt to politically dissect the call for a “Referendum” in establishing a
“Sovereign Thamil Eezham State” in North – East Sri Lanka (SL), that is being
campaigned and lobbied for via internet and of late is being picked up by some
groups and political parties in neighbouring Thamil Nadu in projecting
themselves as very much concerned about Tamil people in SL and also as their
rallying call for TN politics. What prompts this political intervention in
seeing through this call for a “Thamil
Eezham” from outside Sri Lanka, is the total “disconnect” with and its
irrelevance to Tamil politics in Sri Lanka.
Right to Self
Determination – What Does It Mean ?
“Right to self
determination” in Marxist formulation, accepts the right of a nation of people
under “oppression” to secede from its earlier formation of a State, to form its
own separate State.
For Marxists, a
“nationalistic movement” demanding its own “right to determine” how its people
as a society would live within a multi linguistic, multi cultural nation State,
is about supporting increased and improved functional democracy of the State,
that allows all oppressed social segments and classes to have their own
cultural and class identity within modern capitalist development of that nation
State. As Marx enlarged on the right of Ireland to secede, Irish people can
remain federated as an autonomous nation with England, if the Irish people can
have a democratic nation State of their own, accepted by the dominant class of
the English society. And that can not be ruled out.
The reason for such
complex formulations on the “right to self determination” of a nation is the
duality in how a “nation” and a “State” is defined and identified. A “Nation”
is not necessarily a “State”. The Australian “nation” and the Australian
“State” can politically coincidence. It is the single expression of political
power of that single nation and that coincides. But in most countries like
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, there is contradiction that makes the political
expression of the dominant majority nation, refusing or reluctant to accept
other smaller nations in its expression of political power, as the State. The
refusal or reluctance is about who would own capitalist development and its
benefits through State power.
This is what generally
is termed “marginalisation” of minorities, in the current context in our part
of the world, where capitalist development in a “nation State” becomes the main
political debate and life. This is precisely what was written into the DMK
programme in 1963, when it gave up on its demand for a separate Dravidian
State. The ability and the possibility to remain as “political equals” within a
State, is also what Dr. Anton Balasingham interpreted as “Internal self
determination”, when the LTTE agreed to work out a “federal system” of
governance. It was based on that conceptual democratic space, the LTTE signed
the Oslo Declaration in 2002 December.
Background To
“Referendum” Appeal
On 02 January, 2009,
the Sri Lankan army waging war against the LTTE, walked into an empty,
abandoned Kilinochchi town that was “the hub” of the LTTE for well over a
decade and a half. A week later on 09 January, the SL army stormed through
Elephant Pass, after 23 years of complete LTTE control of the A-9 road. From
Adampan to Kilaly to Kilinochchi and then Elephant Pass, it was only a story of
the LTTE retreating, holding the ordinary people as their buffer and the SL
army advancing.
While the LTTE was
facing defeat at every crucial location, a new Tamil group in the US that
calculated Democratic presidential candidate Barak Obama's victory at the US
presidential elections, came together as “Tamils for Obama” (sounds pretty
opportunistic) and on 07 March, 2009,
two months after Elephant Pass fell, wrote to President Obama, requesting a US
initiated resolution to have an “East Timor type referendum” in North-East Sri
Lanka, supervised by the UN. They also wrote to all UN members asking for
support for such a referendum, referring to South Sudan as well.
Their timing in asking
for such a UN Resolution, confuses all logic in accepting it as pragmatic and
realistic, for many serious reasons. Month of March 2009, was when news started
percolating about the political and military sections in the LTTE contradicting
each other and moving apart, in deciding how they could “face defeat” at the
hands of the SL security forces. By end April, the two sections had two very
clear, different and opposing approaches in facing a military defeat.
While the political group led by Pullidevan and Nadesan decided to surrender (and may be thought, they could later develop as an open political group like how the JVP came round after heavy repression and defeat of the 1971 insurgency), the military wing led by Prabhakaran was going to “fight till death”. This contradiction in the LTTE was eventually proved, at the closing of the war.
In such context of
political and military defeat, for a small Tamil group in far off US to ask for
a separate “Thamil Eezham” was more than eccentric. The last concluding
sentence in that appeal by “Tamils for Obama”, is also quite amusing. “Tamils
for Obama is comprised of Tamils who have settled in the U.S. or who were
born in the US”[emphasis added] they said.
Disconnected
arguments on referendum
The letter sent out by
“Tamils for Obama” has a two part argument put forward. One is to say, a referendum
as in East – Timor would end “genocide of Tamils” in SL. The other is that
there is “genocide” continuing in SL. It says,
“While you are
certainly familiar with the U.N.'s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, let us remind you that this document defines any of
the following acts as genocide:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Items (a), (b), and
(c) are well documented as on-going events in Sri Lanka. Many impeccable
sources refer to the genocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka.”
The major qualifying
explanation that had been left out by “Tamils for Obama” in their appeal reads
as, "Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:.....” (emphasis
added)
The East – Timor's
referendum is therefore briefly sketched as follows.
(i)
East-Timor's
ground for referendum -
- The referendum for East – Timor was requested from the UN, by the Indonesian President and Head of State, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in January 1999, after he replaced General Suharto in 1997 and NOT by East Timoreans or their powerful political group, “Fretilin”.
- The request for the referendum by Habibie came during his re democratising programme in post Suharto Indonesia.
- President Habibie publicly accepted that it was not economically beneficial and profitable for Indonesia to hold on to East Timor
- A large part of East Timor including its highlands was under Fretilin and controlled by them in 1999, when Habibie invited the UN to hold a referendum for East Timor.
- Since declaring East Timor an independent State in November 1975, Fretilin went ahead in establishing a de facto government within East Timor, with an organisational structure put in place for implementing its social development programmes in all areas under their control.
- Fretilin was therefore recognised as the legitimate political representation in East Timor, that would effectively campaign for the referendum, mobilising people to vote and stand with the people against all violations.
South Sudan referendum
is another that is being touted as proof for a referendum that should be held
for N – E Sri Lanka to help Tamil people to decide on a Thamil Eezham. The run
up to South Sudan referendum in brief, is as follows.
(ii)
South
Sudan referendum
- For all but 11 of the 48 years since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been engulfed in civil conflict. More than two million people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people sought shelter beyond Sudan's borders as refugees and brought misery and insecurity to the region.
- Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was thus under pressure by Heads of States of the Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to negotiate a cease fire and work out a permanent solution to the conflict.
- IGADD initiated negotiations, a long process that led to signing 06 agreements called “protocols” between the government of Sudan and the South Sudan warring alliance, the “Sudan People's Liberation Movement” (SPLM) beginning in July 2002 and ending in December 2004.
- The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005, between the government of Sudan and the SPLM in Naivasha, Kenya and included all protocols signed previously.
- A “National Unity Government” was thus formed till the scheduled referendum in January 2011.
- In October 2007, the SPLM withdrew from the National Unity Government, accusing the Khartoum based Unity government, dominated by the National Congress Party of President Omar al-Bashir for not honouring the agreement to pull out 15,000 soldiers from Southern oil fields. But said, they would not wage war.
- SPLM rejoined the Unity government on 13 December 2007, after reaching agreement with Khartoum to withdraw troops across the border by 08 January 2008 and funds to be allocated for the census required for the referendum.
- Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir accepted the southern region had a right to choose to secede and the referendum was helpful, because unity, he said "could not be forced by power".
Agreement was also
reached to have at least 60 % of the 3.8
million voters to validate the referendum and a simple majority vote of 50%
plus, in favour of independence of South Sudan, to be valid. Should the turnout
be insufficient in the first referendum, a second was to be held within sixty
days. The referendum was finally held from 9 to 15 January 2011. SPLM cadres were accused of rigging and was
proved so with 10 of the 79 counties exceeding 100% of the voter turnout. On 7
February 2011, the referendum commission published the final results, with
98.83% voting in favour of independence.
The Ground Truth
- The recent beginnings -
The war which ended in
2009 May, officially declared as victorious and over, by HE the President
Rajapaksa on 19 May, had two distinct political factors that to date dominates politics
in Sri Lanka and an uneasy dormant Tamil life in Jaffna, Vanni and the East,
caught in between.
- The Sinhala Buddhist dominance in governance
The war against the LTTE was not
fought as a simple military battle. Over many decades,
the long protracted war had given space for hardened Sinhala Buddhist sentiments and that was capitalised by
the Rajapaksa regime. In fact his election platform
brought all Sinhala extremist parties, groups and individuals together and into a dominant social force against any
attempt at negotiations with the LTTE and the CFA
signed in February 2002. Such Sinhala ideology turned into official government thinking and obsessed with the idea of a
Sinhala “Unitary State”, justified all violations
of human rights in the name of
“eliminating Tamil terrorism”. Young Sinhala
peasant stock from poor, rural families raised into an army and battle trained,
the youth themselves were Sinhala
Buddhist campaigners in their villages, fighting against Tamil “terrorists”.
The war therefore provided
justifications for military dominance in society. The campaign for war against “Tamil terrorists” was turned into a
Sinhala - Buddhist “patriotic”
campaign and entrenched the military in a political role. SL is thus seeing the military entering into urban
planning and development, coast conservation and regulation, non governmental activities, university student
training and encroaching into
schools and even economic activities like the hospitality trade and sports recreation.
SL has thus ended up as a quasi
military regime, living on a Sinhala Buddhist ideology.
The recommendations by the LLRC in requesting the elected government of Rajapaksa to effect “rapid
de-militarisation” of North – East areas and the State, is proof of the military playing a
seriously important role in governance.
- Dismantling of North-East Tamil society and Tamil politics
The war left over 280,000 Tamil
people in the Vanni and adjoining areas, completely uprooted and displaced as refugees, conveniently called
IDPs. The war also left a legacy
of war crimes and crimes against humanity accusations against the Rajapaksa regime, from many international and regional
civil society and human rights organisations
and campaigners. The need for independent investigations have become more and more evident and important, with
passage of time and surfacing of claims for
proof in especially mainstream
international media. Most claims are of little doubt in giving credence to the call for an independent international
inquiry, and is different to the
slogan and the need for a “Tamil Ezham”
Mainland Vanni area -
On the ground, the Tamil people have
been left with no social fabric that could accommodate
people's organisations and civil society activities. No legal social entities like non governmental
organisations were even allowed free access to those areas. Even fisheries co-operatives that survived in some coastal
areas, were brought under
Naval supervision and control. The only organised entities that could not be wiped out were schools and the
Catholic / Christian Church, apart from State departments
and agencies, that now operate under military supervision and the government's coercing political power.
Security forces have also resorted
to land grabbing and in some areas have established new security complexes and also agriculture farms. Most
infrastructure construction have
brought in Sinhala labour and by now into permanent living in some instances. There is a concerted effort in
colonising that could negatively effect the demographic pattern in some Tamil areas.
Vanni had 266,975 registered voters
at the 2010 parliamentary elections with a turn out of 43.9%. The TNA won 03 out 06 parliamentary seats at
this elections.
Jaffna peninsula -
In the whole “Eezham” war spanning
over 25 years, the lobby was Jaffna centred. But the LTTE was never able to have total control of the Jaffna
peninsula, though it was isolated
from the mainland, after LTTE took control of the A-9 land route. Concentration of SL security forces in the
peninsula with other para military organisations
like the EPDP, kept the Jaffna society wholly under control, not allowing any political or social
activities that could challenge the authority of the security forces. Life in Jaffna is reduced to day to day living
and nothing more.
With the opening of the A-9 route
after the war, the security forces themselves have moved into small scale economic enterprises like cafes and
salons in townships along the
A-9 route. Sinhala traders and civilians are consciously promoted to visit
Jaffna and some have been offered
opportunities in trading in the Jaffna peninsula.
Jaffna provincial media is under
military surveillance. There are numerous reports of continued attacks against Jaffna media personnel, who try to
stretch their journalism beyond what the
security forces and para military groups would want.
Jaffna's voting strength in 2010
parliamentary elections was 721,359 with only 23.3% turning out to vote, that saw the TNA winning 05 out of the 08
parliamentary seats.
At the LG elections, the TNA won 24
out of the 32 LG bodies for which elections were
held in 2011 in the districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu.
The Eastern province -
East is a mixed province that had
seen Sinhala colonisation from as early as 1950. The present demography in the province according to the 2012
statistical sheet put out by the
Department of Census and Statistics is – Tamil 40.2%, Sinhala 22.3% and Muslim 36.5%. Batticoloa district has a
majority Tamil population of 72.6%.
This population mix with Trincomalee
and Ampara dominated by Sinhala and Muslim populations,
did not allow any Tamil armed group to dominate its local politics. By 2001 the LTTE had managed to control a small
linear patch – Kokkadicholai area – along
the coast of Batticoloa district. There were also small groups of LTTE cadres that moved around in Tamil majority areas and
penetrated into other areas, on and off.
The 2002 CFA allowed the LTTE an
open presence in Tamil areas, as long as they moved
around without arms and gave them the opportunity to have “political” offices. This gave them space to influence Tamil
people and businesses in Eastern province, especially
in Batticoloa district.
The Rajapaksa regime in its war
strategy, first moved into East and in 2007 cleared the East of all LTTE presence that by then was halved,
with Karuna Amman defecting to
government ranks. Heavy civilian damage in the East was not given due
attention. The lobby as earlier
mentioned, was not so much about casualties in East, but Jaffna and Vanni. The military remained very
conspicuous, with para military groups helping
them with intelligence and surveillance of the province.
Therefore when the Rajapaksa regime
held elections to the then bifurcated Eastern PC in May 2008 with much hype
and Karuna Amman's dissenting ally Chandrakanthan
alias “Pilleyan” contesting with the government party (UPFA), the TNA could not even contest, with the
LTTE still dictating terms. The Rajapaksa regime
was then compelled to accommodate Pilleyan as the EPC Chief Minister.
The post war situation changed the
East considerably and in 2012 September, the TNA
became the largest opposition party in the EPC, with 11 councillors elected as against the government coalition that managed
15 councillors.
- Tamils outside North – East
Contrary to what the
Diaspora and the TN politicians prefer to project, the SL Tamil population is
not only restricted to Jaffna, Vanni and the East. They have a sizeable
concentration in the city of Colombo and its adjacent municipality area, the
Dehiwala-Mt. Lavinia area, with traditionally rooted economic and social life.
The city of Colombo
with its population of close to 753,000 in 2011, had almost 29% SL Tamils
residing within its municipal area and another 2.2% Tamils of Indian origin. In
the Dehiwala-Mt. Lavinia Municipality area, the Tamil population is 10.84%
of a total 209,000 population. What
needs to be noted here is the fact that out of a 2.27 mn SL Tamil population as
recorded in the 2012 census, almost 10% (207,000 plus) live in Colombo city and
Dehiwala-Mt. Lavinia alone.
This population, or
the larger majority of them, have lived in these areas for many generations and
they have their businesses, their investments and their property too, in these
areas. Their social and economic life is rooted in the city culture and some in
the Diaspora have invested in property within Colombo since the 2002 CFA and
the conclusion of the war in 2009 May.
Passions &
Ignorance in TN
There is apparently no
logical reason for TN politics to take up a call for a “Separate Tamil State”
in Sri Lanka, after giving up on their own demand for a separate “Dravidian
State” in India. The movement for a Tamil nation State in India, commonly
called the “Dravidian” movement goes back to 1916 when the “South Indian
Welfare Association” was formed against the economic and political power of the
Brahmins.
In 1949, with C.N.
Annathurai breaking off from the DK and forming his own Dravida Munnethra
Kazhagam (DMK) with many young, fire brand speakers, the Dravidian movement in
South India got radicalised and grounded with a pride in Tamil language and
culture.
Its call for a
separate “Dravida Nadu” though emotionally fired against Hindi speaking, Aryan
and Brahminic Northern India, lost ground in 1953 when Nehru had the “States
Reorganising Committee” deflate the concept of a separate Dravidian Linguistic
State, by carving out 03 new linguistic States out of the old Madrasi province.
Kerala, Andra and Karnataka was redefined with “Tamil Nadu” made a lone Tamil
linguistic State that left the larger “Dravidian” concept a mismatch.
In 1960, the DMK
dropped the slogan “Dravida Nadu”, found it gained more support among Tamil
voters and tripled its State Assembly representation to 50 in 1962 elections.
In 1963, the DMK officially gave up the
slogan for a Dravidian State and rewrote their party programme. A militant and
a leading figure then in the DMK, Murasoli Maran was quoted as saying, "I am Tamil first but I am also an Indian. Both can exist
together, provided there is space for cultural nationalism." A leading theoretician in DMK, Era Sezhiyan who co-authored the new DMK
programme in 1963 was also quoted in similar vein. He had said, it was more
practical to demand a higher degree of autonomy for Tamil Nadu, instead.
Possibilities &
Necessities
This brief coverage of
Tamil or Dravidian history on either side of the Palk Strait, allows for a few
conclusions on possibilities of resolving the political conflict of the SL
Tamil people within a democratic capitalist State and on the necessities for
such resolving of the political conflict in establishing a profitable shared
future.
First, in drawing
parallels with East-Timor and South Sudan, the most important conclusions are,
- The call for separation needs a strong, structured lobby within people living on the ground. In both East – Timor and South Sudan there were such strong political organisations for campaigning on the ground that had recognition and credibility among the people. In SL, that is a total absence, as even the TNA does not heed such a call.
- The major opponent in both countries, Habibie and al-Bashir for their own reasons, were willing to work out a process for a referendum. But not in Sri Lanka.
- In East-Timor, Habibie got the UN to run the referendum and in South Sudan, al-Bashir agreed to work with IGAAD and its donor countries. SL is far away from such a situation.
On Dravidian
nationalism and separatism in South India, leaders learnt through praxis that
to live together in a united country with adequate and effective mechanisms for
power sharing, is more worth and economically profitable than fighting for a
separate Dravidian State.
Therefore, the use of
the much abused word “genocide”, that is promoted as reason for separatism
for SL Tamils, now has to be seriously proved before calling for a “referendum”
and those who call for such a referendum would have to explain,
- how over 10% of the SL Tamil people in post war SL continue to live in and around Colombo, in the Western Province, invest and do business without serious accusations of crimes, abductions, arbitrary arrests and extra judicial killings, that even the Sinhala South is now complaining of.
- how in post war SL, the TNA campaigned against the ruling UPFA and won majority number of parliamentary seats from the North at the 2010 April elections.
- how in post war SL, the TNA contesting against the ruling UPFA in LG elections in Northern districts was voted in large scale to gain control of the vast majority of the LG bodies
“Genocide” can only be
bandied about in the Diaspora and in TN, but will not be proved under a State,
how ever undemocratic and racist the State is, when Tamil people participate in
open electoral campaigns and elect their own representation for different tiers
of governance. When they can invest and indulge in trade and business and have
representations in business chambers as well. That is reason why democratic
political parties of Tamil people in SL do
not take up the call for a “referendum” and do not talk about “genocide”
like those in the Diaspora and in Tamil Nadu.
What then is the
alternative ?
The alternative for
the SL Tamils living in SL, is NOT a separate State in North – East, though
“Tamils for Obama” and other such alien Tamil groups would want to live with
romantic answers for them.
The answer for the
Tamils living in SL is to have democratic space as with Dravidians in Karnataka
and Kerala and Tamils in Tamil Nadu, to live with their own cultural identity
and a share in capitalist development
(in this era), they are being denied for now. This requires serious and far
fetched constitutional reforms that would give them the right to have their
political expressions within the “new” State. The important question is, how
such reforms could be effected, with a Sinhala government that is not prepared
to accept such reforms that could undermine the dominant role it plays in the
name of the majority Sinhala society.
A formulation that has
majority Sinhala – Buddhist consensus in accommodating minority political
aspirations was arrived at the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), that
came out with its Final Report after continuous deliberations from July 2006
till April 2009 agreeing on power sharing that goes beyond the Delhi crafted 13th
Amendment, with a bi-cameral parliament.
Unfortunately, this
proposal is not campaigned for dialogue and asked for as a basis for
negotiations by the Tamil organisations. They would not, as this contradicts
their romantic idea of a separate State. It is not made public by the Rajapaksa
regime, as this goes beyond their Sinhala political project. For the Tamils
outside SL, living with a romantic slogan of a “separate” State, it pays to
have Rajapaksa shelving the APRC Final Report and for Rajapaksa, it pays to
have the Diaspora and TN fringe politics pushing their slogan of “genocide” and
a “separate” State, for that would never have space for any negotiations. But
none would pay to have a democratic, power sharing solution to the Tamil
political conflict. That political conflict needs to be resolved for the
Sinhala South also to have a democratic State and shared development for both
nations.
Recommend reading –
APRC Final Report and could be accessed ; http://www.groundviews.org/wp-content/uploads/July-20-APRC-Final-Report.pdf?4d4646
Kusal Perera
16 March, 2013