Centre for Policy Alternatives
The
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was established in May 2010
and the report of the Commission (LLRC Report) was presented to the President in
November 2011, with its subsequent tabling in the Parliament in December 2011.
At the outset there were concerns, amongst others, about its limited mandate to
investigate violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and to
address the root causes of Sri Lanka’s conflict[1].
The (CPA) welcomed the release of the LLRC Report
but cautioned that that there were several shortcomings related to both process
as well as substantive recommendations. CPA called on the GoSL to implement the
LLRC recommendations without delay and with sincerity and commitment, whilst
noting that the LLLRC report constituted the initiation of a process of
reconciliation and not the end of it.[2]
Confusion
persists as to the Government’s overall stance on the LLRC, including whether
the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) endorses its findings and recommendations.[3] In March 2012, the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution calling on the GoSL to
implement the recommendations of the LLRC. Subsequently the GoSL drafted the
National Plan of Action to implement the recommendations of the LLRC (LLRC
Action Plan). The Action Plan was approved by cabinet in July 2012.[4] In March 2013 the UNHRC adopted a
second resolution entitled Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri
Lanka and in July 2013 the GoSL added a further 53 recommendations made by the
LLRC to LLRC Action Plan.
With
Sri Lanka fast approaching the 5th year anniversary of the defeat of
the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May of this year, the sources
of the conflict are still being sustained and even reproduced. The situation in
respect of Human Rights protection warrants urgent
attention.
As
flagged during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in
Colombo in November 2013, dissent is met with hostility from the GoSL.[5] Continued
attacks on the media, threats against Human Rights Defenders (HRDs), incidents
of arbitrary arrests and detention, reports of torture, gender based violence,
institutionalized militarization, grave concerns regarding the independence of
Judiciary and Police continue to seriously undermine the rule of law and by
extension the reconciliation process. In addition, the past year has seen an
increase in the number of incidents of attacks against places of religious
worship- most of which have been conducted very publicly with near total
impunity. All these factors reinforce the critical need to focus on the
protection of Human Rights, the rule of law and the reversal of the culture of
impunity in moving towards the goal of reconciliation, unity and democratic
governance in Sri Lanka.[6]
Given
the record of unsatisfactory outcomes of previously appointed Commissions,[7] the lethargic prosecution of issues
of accountability and the importance of implementing the recommendations of the
LLRC as a first step towards reconciliation and a sustainable peace, CPA has
conducted a critical study on the GoSL’s progress -up to February 2014- in
respect of its LLRC Action Plan, based on information available in the public
domain.
The
table thematically lists out the recommendations of the LLRC as they have been
adopted by the Action Plan, the progress with regard to the implementation of
those recommendations as per the progress updates in January 2014 on the GoSL’s
dedicated LLRC Action Plan website[8] and finally, a commentary column
that is dedicated to CPA’s concerns on the progress or lack thereof, in the
implementation of the recommendations’ thus far. This commentary does not
substantively address all of the broad issues highlighted by the Report, nor
does it aim to do a complete situational analysis of GoSL’s reconciliation
efforts. In the absence of Right to Information legislation – a recommendation
of the LLRC- CPA relied on information gathered by civilians and non - state
actors on the ground and on information publicly available to ordinary citizens.
That challenges in obtaining information needed to assess progress made on
implementing the LLRC Action Plan were clearly demonstrated in the course of
this study, thereby highlighting one of the key setbacks of an islandwide
reconciliation programme: the lack of accessibility, transparency and the
availability of information.
Some
of the key areas of concern are as follows;
Disparity
between Proposed Activity and Update: There are several instances where
there is a mismatch between the LLRC recommendation and suggested activity
contained in the LLRC Action Plan.[9] These continue to persist even in
the progress report on the implementation of the LLRC Action Plan, which renders
the progress achieved meaningless.
Lack
of genuine interest to involve and accept the support of civil society, local
and foreign agencies: The GoSL in certain areas has neglected the
expertise of organizations that can support their activities. For example civil
society and public consultation should be done on matters relating to
legislation and public policy. These organizations can also provide the GoSL
with financial and human resource assistance to expedite the activities.[10]
Lack
of Clarity/ Unreliability of statistics provided; There are
contradictory statements from the GoSL regarding the extent of the military
presence in the Northern Province. As far back as June 2012 the GoSL claimed
that the number of troops in the Jaffna peninsula had been
reduced from 27,000 in December 2009 to 15,600 in June 2012.[11] In September 2013 and January
2014, President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated that the number of troops had been
reduced to between 8,000 -12,000.[12] However it was reported recently
that the Secretary to the President, Lalith Weeratunga had stated that the
number of security forces personnel in the Northern Province as at October 2013
was 80,000.[13]
The
numbers mentioned by the Secretary to the President are still quite conservative
as when compared to the number of existing security forces battalions[14] and land being acquired for the
construction of military cantonments in the Northern Province.[15] They do highlight an important
and serious concern with regard to the credibility of statistics provided by the
GoSL.
Furthermore
the progress update provided by the GoSL states that military involvement in
civilian administration does not occur. However, reports from the Northern
Province indicate that the military remains involved in the daily lives of
civilians.[16] Furthermore the Presidential
Task Force for Resettlement, development and security in the Northern Province
(PTF) continues to play a prominent role in activities conducted in the Northern
Province, including being the key agency tasked with the responsibility for
implementing several activities as per the LLRC Action Plan.
Action
Plan does not include activities: There are an alarmingly high number
of instances where no Activities are proposed in order to achieve a
recommendation included in the LLRC Action Plan,[17] whilst in several others there
is no mention of the key responsible agency or time frame or key performance
indicator in order to evaluate the implementation of the recommendation[18]. In some instances none of these
components have been included.[19] A majority of such cases relate
to recommendations added to the LLRC Action Plan in July 2013. This raises
serious questions as to the bona fides of the GoSL in including these
recommendations in the LLRC Action Plan.
Key
implementation mechanisms being stalled: Several mechanisms[20] included in the LLRC Action Plan
to deal with a number of important recommendations have not even begun
functioning. CPA had previously indicated that these mechanisms could be used as
a “delaying tactic”.[21]
Independent
Institutions have been undermined: The LLRC Report placed particular
emphasis on the need to strengthen independent institutions and made several key
recommendations to this end. The Progress reported suggests almost all of these
recommendations have been implemented.[22] However considering the
provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the power it
confers on the Executive President, none of the supposedly independent
institutions (that are presently in operation) are actually ‘independent’.[23]
Investigations
of Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law: The LLRC did not adequately address issues regarding violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law with criticism leveled against
its findings.[24]
The
role of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and other government actors in
investigatory processes involving incidents implicating the military raises
questions as to the impartiality and independence of such investigations.
Furthermore the key reports cited in the government update both raise more
questions than they answer with the report of the Army Court of Inquiry not
being made public and the Report of the Army Board of Inquiry recommending the
appointment of further commissions in order to investigate the same
allegations.[25]
The
current situation with regard to the implementation of the LLRC recommendations,
against the backdrop of two resolutions on Sri Lanka in the UNHRC focusing on
this, underscores the critical importance of civil society and international
attention to issues of human rights protection and accountability in Sri Lanka.
Faced with augmented and persistent challenges, democratic governance, durable
peace, reconciliation and unity in Sri Lanka require that it be
reinforced.
Download the
commentary/introduction to the full report, published below, as a PDF here. Download the comprehensive report in table form as a PDF
here or read online here.
[1]Daily News, “Mandate of
Lessons Learnt”, 16 August 2010, (Available at http://archives.dailynews.lk/2010/08/16/fea02.asp).
[2] Centre for Policy
Alternatives(CPA), Press Release, “Release of the Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission Report”, January 2012, (Available at http://www.cpalanka.org/final-version-release-of-the-lessons-learnt-and-reconciliation-commission-llrc-report/).
[3] Cabinet Spokesman and Media
Minister Keheliya Rambukwella stated that the government could “implement the
recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)
only according to a road map as spelled out earlier and the government could not
implement the report in its entirety without having a dialogue with all the
stakeholders.” (Kelum Bandara, “Can implement LLRC recommendations only
according to road map: Keheliya”, Daily Mirror, 6 January 2012) ; Minister Nimal
Siripala de Silva the Leader of House in the Sri Lankan Parliament and a member
of the Government delegation to the 19th Session of the UN HRC stated that “The
LLRC has gone beyond the mandate given to it by President Mahinda Rajapaksa at
certain points. The government has to consider what parts of the recommendations
can be implemented immediately and what parts of the recommendations need
further attention, in depth study etc and how they make an impact on the
country’s future.” (N.G, “‘Constitution allows state to hold referendum only for
single reason’, Daily News, 27 March 2012); Acting Media Minister and Cabinet
spokesperson Minister Lakshman Yapa Abeywardana stated that the “Government is
committed to implement Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)
recommendations deemed acceptable to Sri Lanka but will not give in to undue
pressure.“ (BBC Sinhala.com “Parliament to decide LLRC implementation”, 5 April
2012, last accessed on 21 August 2012, (Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2012/04/120405_yapa.shtml).
[4]News.lk, “Cabinet Approves
National Action Plan to implement LLRC recommendations", 27 July 2012,
(Available at http://www.news.lk/news/sri-lanka/2676-cabinet-approves-national-action).
[5] Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, “Human Rights and Democracy 2012: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Report”, (Available athttp://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/human-rights-in-countries-of-concern/sri-lanka/quarterly-updates-sri-lanka/?showall=1).
[6] Human Rights Watch, “World
Report 2014”, (Available athttp://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/sri-lanka?page=1);
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Human Rights and Democracy 2012: The 2012
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report”, (Available at http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/human-rights-in-countries-of-concern/sri-lanka/?showall=1).
[7]CPA, Background Paper
Document, “A List of Commissions and Committees Appointed by GoSL (2006-2013)”
January 2014, (Available at http://www.cpalanka.org/a-list-of-commissions-and-committees-appointed-by-gosl-2006-2013/);
Law and Society Trust, “A Legacy to Remember; Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry
1963-2002” (Edited by Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena), September 2010, (Available
at http://www.lawandsocietytrust.org/PDF/a%20legacy%20to%20remember%3B%20sri%20lanka's%20commissions%20of%20inquiry.pdf).
[8]National Plan of Action for
the Implementation of LLRC Recommendations, (Available at http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/);
International Humanitarian Law Issues (Available at http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/images/International%20Humanitarial%20Law%20Issues.pdf);
Human Rights (Available at http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/images/Human%20Rights.pdf);
Land Return and Resettlement (Available at http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/images/Land%20Return%20and%20Resettlement.pdf);
Restitution/Compensatory Relief (Available athttp://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/images/Restitution.pdf);
Reconciliation (Available at http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/images/Reconciliation.pdf).
[9] See LLRC Action Plan –
Progress Report, January 2014, 9.57, 9.73, 9.81, 9.111, 9.270
[10] [10]See LLRC Action Plan –
Progress Report, January 2014, 9.59, 9.115 a-c, 9.115e,9.144,9.148, 9.270,
Interim recommendation 1(b)
[11] Defence.lk, “Troop
strength in Jaffna drastically reduced”, 17 June 2012, available at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=troop_strength_in_jaffna_drastically_reduced_says_defence_secretary_20120617_01
[12]Groundviews, “The
Al-Jazeera Interview- Calling the bluff, 29 September 2013, available at http://groundviews.org/2013/09/29/the-al-jazeera-interview-with-mahinda-rajapaksa-calling-the-bluff/ ;
Colombo Telegraph, “President Rajapaksa claims 12 00 soldiers left in North”,
available at https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/president-rajapaksas-lies-claims-12000-soldiers-left-in-the-north-but-reality-is-more-than-150000/
[13] Colombo Telegraph, “Lalith
Weeratunge rebuts president on Northern troop numbers” February 2014, available
at https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/lalith-weertaunge-rebuts-president-on-northern-troop-numbers/
[14] Colombo Telegraph,
“President Rajapaksa claims 12 00 soldiers left in North”, available at https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/president-rajapaksas-lies-claims-12000-soldiers-left-in-the-north-but-reality-is-more-than-150000/
[15] Land acquisition brief p
43- 47
[16] See Centre for Monitoring
Election Violence, Northern Provincial Council Election 2013 – Communiqué No 1,
13th September 2013, available at http://cmev.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/northern-provincial-council-election-2013-e28093-communiquecc81-no-1.pdf;
Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, Northern Provincial Council Election
2013 – Mullaitivu District Situation Report, 20 September 2013, available at http://cmev.wordpress.com/2013/09/20/northern-provincial-council-election-2013-mullaitivu-district-situation-report/
[17] See LLRC Action Plan,
9.70, 9.93, 9.98, 9.99, 9.100, 9.105, 9.112, 9.139, 9.144, 9.145, 9.147, 9.148,
9.165, 9.221, 9.222, 9.230
[18] See LLRC Action Plan,
9.57, 9.115e, 9.14, 9.55, 9.58, 9.65, 9.70, 9.80, 9.93, 9.94, 9.95, 9.98, 9.99,
9.100, 9.105, 9.112, 9.139, 9.144, 9.145, 9.147, 9.148, 9.165, 9.220, 9.221,
9.222, 9.230
[19] See LLRC Action Plan,
9.22, 9.26,
[20] Parliamentary Select
Committee, The 4th Land Commission.
[21] Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Bhavani Fonseka, Luwie Ganeshathasan, Mirak Raheem, Commentary on
the National Plan of Action to implement the recommendations of the Lessons
Learnt and Reconciliation Committee, August 2012, (Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/103800519/CPA
- Commentary - on - LLRC - Action - Plan).
[22] See Table 9.57, 9.215,
9.218, 9.219
[23]Rohan Edrisinha and Aruni Jayakody
(eds), “The 18th Amendment to the Constitution: Substance and Process”,
2011
[24] The LLRC reached its
conclusions without examining specific information including the chain of
command and the authorities’ prior knowledge of the ground situation. They also
seemed to have relied heavily on Government sources for their analysis,
disregarding important information available with those who were witnesses of
the last stage of the war. (See CPA, “Release of the Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission Report”, 4 January 2011, available at:
http://www.cpalanka.org/release-of-the-lessons-learnt-and-reconciliation-commission-llrcreport/)
[25] Army.lk, “Full Report of
the Army Board on LLRC Observations”, “OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ACTION
PLAN FOR MEASURE S TO SAFEGUARD CIVILIANS AND AVOID CIVILIAN CASUALTIES”, Para
57 and 58.
