Disappearance: to appoint an Army Board of Inquiry to investigate fully the instances referred to in Chapter 4 of LLRC report
C 4 video: Board of Inquiry to investigate the matter fully in order to clear the good name of the Sri Lanka Army and also to bring any offenders ( of creating the video), to justice.
Civilians killed : The so called civilian casualties are mainly consisted of LTTE cadres killed in combat, civilians killed by LTTE for political and other reasons and civilians killed by LTTE whilst attempting to flee LTTE held areas.
Accountability: Impose mandatory legal obligations on non-state actors to observe Rules of War, the role of International Humanitarian Agencies (ICRC, MSF etc) in Internal war situations etc.
Para Military: The Government has already disarmed/rehabilitated exmilitants groups
Human Rights:The S.L. Constitution and the existing legal framework are adequate to safeguard the HRs
Militarisation: The Military Civil Affairs Officers attached to formation headquarters should continue to function as liaison officers to assist the civil authorities to implement Nation Building Projects. The police are in total control and Armed Forces are confined to static duties at key points.
Policing: The Police in Sri Lanka should be placed under the Ministry of Defence at all times
23. In
formulating its recommendations, the Board took into account inter alia the
following;
a. The
obligation to educate the members of the Armed Forces in HR Law and IHL.
b. Measures
to safeguard civilians and to avoid civilians casualties during Military
Operations.
c. The
importance of the Tamil Language not only as a medium of
communication
but also as part of Counter Terrorist / Counter Insurgency Doctrine.
d. The need
to produce quality soldiers in the post-war scenario.
e.
Recommendations made by the LLRC to investigate the specific instances referred
to at Chapter 4 of the LLRC Report.
f.
Recommendations made by LLRC to establish the truth or otherwise of the
allegations arising out of Channel 4 Video footage referred to at Chapter 4 of
the LLRC Report.
24. The
Board has restricted its recommendations to those areas which the Armed Forces
alone could implement leaving the other areas to relevant state agencies
concerned.
HUMANITARIAN LAW ISSUE : ACTION PLAN
PROPOSED BY THE ARMY BOARD
56. LLRC
has conceded (at Paragraph 4.262) that the military strategy that was adopted
by the Army to secure the LTTE held areas to be one that was carefully
conceived, in which the protection of the civilian population has given the
highest priority.
In reaching this conclusion the LLRC has taken account of the various steps
taken by the Army to identify precise targets such as deployment of Long Range
Reconnaissance Patrols, procedures followed in carrying out air strikes,
utilization of UAVs etc.
The LLRC has also conceded that the movement of the Army was deliberately slow
during the final stage of the conflict, thereby evidencing a carefully worked
out strategy of avoiding civilian casualties or minimizing them. In this
backdrop, the questions whether civilian casualties in fact occurred or whether
such incidents were collateral or incidental damages that are inherent with the
vagaries of war have not been answered affirmatively by the LLRC. Furthermore,
the details given in Chapter 4 on various instances of civilian casualties are
not sufficient for this Board to come to a firm conclusion with regard to the
said matter. Nevertheless, this Board recommends to appoint a Board of Inquiry
to investigate fully with regard the instances referred to in Chapter 4.
57. It is a
common practice by LTTE to classify LTTE cadres killed in combat, civilians
killed by LTTE for various reasons (such as for their anti –LTTE beliefs),
civilians killed by LTTE whilst fleeing to the Government areas, civilians died
during their flight to freedom for reasons such as drowning, exhaustion, land
mines etc and
LTTE cadres
and civilian illegally left Sri
Lanka and presently domiciled abroad as Missing
persons to evoke international sympathy. LLRC Report itself (at
Paragraph 4.321) observes that LTTE had committed grave violations of core
principles of IHL inter alia
using of civilians as Human Shields, the practice of placing military equipment
in NFZs, firing at civilians trying to escape into safe areas, use of suicide
attacks causing loss to civilian lives etc. LLRC also observes (at Paragraph
4.359 (xii)) that considerable civilian casualties may have occurred due to
cross-fire, deliberate firing at civilians by LTTE, dynamics of the conflict
situations, the perils of geographical terrain, using civilians as human
shields by LTTE and the LTTE’s refusal to let the hostages get out of harm’s
way. In this backdrop, doubts exit as to the alleged incidents of
abductions and disappearances submitted to LLRC by various persons and the
numbers indicated as disappeared. In any event the details with regard
to alleged disappearances and abductions mentioned in chapter 4 are
insufficient to identify the locations and Units/ Formations. However,
the Board recommends to appoint a Board of Inquiry to investigate fully the
instances referred to in Chapter 4.
58. LLRC
has noted the fact that certain technical experts have taken the view that the Channel
4 video footages have extensive technical and forensic ambiguities
suggesting that the video tapes are fakes. LLRC has found as a matter of fact
that there are strongly argued points opposing the integrity of the video and
the authenticity of the events recorded (paragraphs 4.369 and 4.370). The LLRC
had taken steps to obtain an independent opinion from Professor EA Yfantis,
professor of computer science at the University
of Navada, USA
and based on the extensive video graphic and mathematical analysis of the videos, Professor Yfantis has
concluded that the video footage in questions were orchestrated videos:
(paragraph 4.372). The LLRC has shared significant doubts expressed in the
integrity of the video and concluded that such disinformation would constitute
grave damage and injustice to those soldiers who fought professionally and
sacrificed their lives to save other innocent lives from LTTE stronghold
(paragraph 4.3766). In the premises, this Board recommends to appoint a
Board of Inquiry to investigate the matter fully in order to clear the good
name of the Sri Lanka Army and also to bring any offenders, to justice.
59. The
Board concludes that the Armed Forces had taken every precaution to minimize
civilian casualties. However in order to eliminate/minimize civilian casualties
and co-lateral damage in future operations, the Board
recommends that;
a. To
appoint Army Boards on all disciplines such as infantry tactics, special
operations, arty fire, Armour employment, joint operations etc in MOUT /FIBUA
environments to formulate new doctrines on these aspects.
b. To
appoint a Tri Service Board to design military doctrines incorporating new
tactical and technical methodologies and utilization of high tech equipment.
60. At
present IHL principles applicable in internal war situations have not
adequately addressed the various complex issues. The existing rules are
seemingly applied to state actors only. Further there is no specific guidelines
with regard to the role of International Humanitarian Agencies in internal war
situations. Therefore it is recommended that
a. Tri
Service Board consisting of legal officers to research and formulate new
principles / ROEs for internal war situations incorporating aspects such as unilateral
designation of NFZs, imposing mandatory legal obligations on non-state actors to
observe Rules of War, the role of International Humanitarian Agencies (ICRC,
MSF etc) in Internal war situations etc.
b. To
enhance the present IHL/HR Law dissemination programmes to reach all members of
the armed forces and to re-design the courses to cover basic, middle level and
advanced training on IHL / HR with the help of International Organizations.
61. The
Board notes that so called civilian casualties are mainly consisted of LTTE
cadres killed in combat, civilians killed by LTTE for political and other
reasons and civilians killed by LTTE whilst attempting to flee LTTE held areas.
However in the spirit of reconciliation, the board recommends that the Government
should implement a system to compensate the Next of Kins of all those
killed and injured in the entire Island
irrespective of their ethnicities or political affiliations.
62. As
outlined in the previous paragraph, the death toll has been highly exaggerated
by LTTE and western powers in order to bring discredit to the GOSL. Therefore
it is recommended to conduct a professionally designed household survey
covering the North & East to ascertain first-hand the scale and the
circumstances of death and injury to civilians, as well as damage to property
during the period of conflict. At present a census is in progress to cover all
households in the North & East.
HUMAN
RIGHTS: ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY THE ARMY BOARD
39. The
Board observes that despite the lifting of Emergency and all restrictions in
the N & E, LTTE and Tamil Diaspora are conducting a relentless campaign to
discredit the GOSL and if foreigners themselves could see the prevailing
situation in the North & East that will be an ante-dote to this adverse
propaganda. Therefore, in order to counter the negative image portrayed
with regard to the condition in the North and East the following actions are
proposed;
a. The
relevant state agencies (Tourist Board, Government Information
Department etc)
must conduct a rigorous propaganda campaign to boost up foreign travel and
trade in the North and East.
b. The
manpower and machinery of the Armed Forces should be utilized to assist the
relevant state agencies to develop tourism and hotel industry in the North and
East.
40. The Board observes that the S.L. Constitution and the
existing legal framework are adequate to safeguard the HRs of the people
including the religious and language rights. The board recommends that armed forces should
implement policies and programs to foster communal and religious harmony in the
forces and conduct programmes to improve PR.
41. The
Board observes that during the 30 year old war non-proficiency in Tamil and
English languages had placed the SL Army officers/soldiers at a great
disadvantage.
Therefore
the Board recommends that Armed Forces should develop proficiency in two or
more languages. Tamil language and English language teaching programmes should
be given priority and incentives to be given for those acquiring two or more
languages.
42. The
Board observes that the Government has already disarmed/rehabilitated
exmilitants groups. In this context the Board proposes that;
a. The
police should continue with their present operations to eradicate the
proliferation of illegal weapons.
b. An
amnesty period should be offered and rewards should be given to persons
surrendering arms and ammunition.
c. Ex
militants may be absorbed into the police after proper security checks and
giving special training.
d. All Ex
militants should be given jobs and land in order to absorb them into the normal
civil society.
LAND ISSUES
RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT: ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY THE ARMY BOARD
13. The
Govt has already taken measures to normalize the life in the North and East.
The Emergency has been lifted and people can go about their day to day
activities without hindrance. Most of the restrictions which had been
previously imposed due to security
reasons are no longer imposed except in near vicinities of harbours, naval
bases and cantonments and these restrictions generally apply to the entire Island. However even in security sensitive areas local
inhabitants are permitted to engage in their day to day activities. The Board
recommends that the existing limited restrictions too should be lifted by the
end of year 2012.
14. At the
conclusion of the humanitarian operation, the civil administration in the North
was not in a position to conduct development activities immediately. Hence the
Army had to fill the vacuum. Unlike other countries (including occupied Germany and Japan
aftermath of WWII) Sri Lanka
did not wait for a stabilization period. At a very early stage Sri Lanka
initiated rebuilding the North. As the only organized body in the field, the
Army gave the impetus to the rehabilitation process. With the
re-establishment of Government Writ in the North the Army has totally handed
over the civil administration to the civil authorities headed by the Governor
and the District Secretaries. The Board
recommends that Civil Affairs Officers attached to formation headquarters
should continue to function as liaison officers to assist the civil authorities
to implement Nation
Building Projects.
15. With
regard to the presence of Military bases in the North and East, the Board
observes that the Government has an absolute right to maintain its armed forces
anywhere in the Island according to the
strategic and security needs. At present Tamil Diaspora operating from foreign
countries are trying to de-stabilize Sri Lanka
and so long as foreign governments give them a free hand their activities would
pose a clear and present danger to the national security of Sri Lanka. Hence
there is an absolute need to locate our armed forces at strategically important
locations. However the Board recommends that Military bases should be located
in such a manner so as to cause minimum inconvenience to the public.
16. The
Army has a huge responsibility in completing demining in the newly resettled
areas for the civil population to conduct day to day activities without any mine
risk. Therefore the presence of the SLA is
very vital until this task is completed and declared the whole area as mine
free.
17. LLRC
has observed that certain coastal areas in the North and East have been
occupied by the Navy. For any insurgency or terrorist movement to sustain in Sri Lanka such
groups must be able to obtain their logistical needs from the outside. The
Board also notes that in view of trans-border nature of the present day
terrorism and increase of piracy in the Indian Ocean,
the Navy will be called upon to play a bigger role not only in Brown Waters,
but also in Blue Waters, even beyond our
territorial limits.
Further it
is imperative that Air Force must augment the
surveillance capabilities of the Navy. In this context it is imperative
that doctrines with regard to joint services operations should be developed to
meet the future threats.
Therefore the Board recommends
that
a. A Tri
Service Board should be appointed to formulate doctrines on maritime warfare
and costal protection.
b. In order
to expand the present Blue water and Brown water capabilities of the Navy, a
Board of Officers should be appointed by the Navy to formulate new doctrines on
Naval warfare.
c. Air
patrolling and maritime surveillance capabilities of the Air Force should be
upgraded and in this regard a Board of Officers should be appointed by the Air
Force to formulate new doctrines on these aspects.
RESTITUTION/COMPENSATORY RELIEF AND RECONCILIATION:ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY THE ARMY BOARD
24. The
LLRC has made observations with regard to the presence of Military bases in the
North and East. The Board observes that the Government has an absolute
right to maintain its armed forces anywhere in the Island
according to its strategic and security needs. The Board also notes that of
Military bases are located causing minimum inconvenience to the public.
Aftermath of the Humanitarian operations many HSZs/lands previously occupied by
the Armed Forces have been released to the public.
However the
Board recommends that;
a. Armed
Forces should appoint special boards to find out the extent of HSZs and other
formal or informal occupation of properties by each force. The same board
to review the need to occupy these properties and forward recommendations to
release HSZs and other properties as much as possible having considered the
present national security needs in perspective. The board should give priority
to release private houses/lands and religious places when making
recommendations.
b. Land
that is identified to be vitally required for security purposes based on this
joint assessment are to be legally acquired at the market rates and in addition
owners should be given alternative lands.
25. The
Board observes that during the 30 years of war, LTTE terrorists had laid mines
indiscriminately violating all International norms governing mine warfare.
Therefore SLA has been entrusted with the
daunting task of demining the liberated areas. Hence the presence of the SLA is very vital until this task is completed. It is
noted that
the Sri Lanka Army engineers have accounted for 90% of the demining effort. It
is re-recommended to increase the number of humanitarian demining units (HDU)
with sophisticated demining equipment. This will also enable the Sri Lanka Army to
undertake demining operations worldwide in future.
26. LLRC
has made observations to demilitarize the North and East as rapidly as possible
and handover the administration to Civil authorities. However the Board
observes that the civil administration has already been handed over to the
civil authorities.
It is also be noted that Tamil Diaspora domiciled in foreign countries and
certain extremist political parties are trying to de-stabilize Sri Lanka.
Hence as long as this thereat exits, it is imperative that Armed Forces
should closely monitor the security situation in the country and to this end
they must be located in security sensitive areas.
Hence the
Government has an absolute right to station Armed Forces at places which are
strategically important. However the board observes that at present the
police are in total control and Armed Forces are confined to static duties at
key points. The Board recommends a gradual withdrawal of armed forces from all
public security duties.
27. The
Board observe that the Government Civil Machinery is completely in control of
the civil administration in the North and East. However with the rapid
development programmes that are underway in the North and East the Armed Forces
are required to support
the civil authorities in some of these tasks. The board recommends that in
order to ensure the close coordination with the civil administration, Civil
Affairs Officers attached to formation headquarters should be functioned as the
principle liaison officers between the civil administration and the military.
It is also proposed to establish a Directorate of Civil Affairs under the
Director General Staff Branch to coordinate CIMIC programmes.
28. The
committee agrees that in many countries the Police do come under the Home
Ministry or Provincial Administration. However these countries do not
face wide spread internal disorders. Police in countries that face such threats
(example India during the
Mumbai attack) have proved to be total failures. Therefore the committee
recommends that the Police in Sri Lanka
should be placed under the Ministry of Defence at all times. It is
proposed that a Ministry of Defence Board should study and make
recommendations with regard to the Role of Police as a Counter – terrorism
agency.
CONCLUSION
1. This
Board has analyzed the LLRC Report in detail and notes that the Tamils who were
the 1st and last victims of LTTE terrorism have paid glowing tribute to the
Armed Forces for their exemplary conduct during the Humanitarian Operation.
2. The
Armed Forces had been the unwitting actors in the 30 year old tragi-comedy
which finally concluded on 19th May 2009. Although the Armed Forces are called
upon to take actions on the LLRC recommendations (which they will do in their
customary efficiency), it is the civil society who is required to do or undo
most of the recommendations made by the LLRC. In the South Asian context,
the Police, civil service and the judiciary who are the most vital elements in
counter - insurgency/ counter - terrorism operations had been most conspicuous
by their lackluster performance
during the 30 year old war.
3. When the
war broke out in 1983 the Government in power or the Ministry of Defence had no
coherent strategy to counter the LTTE. Hence a rag-tag terrorist group which
started with revolvers and shotguns had developed into mini Army running a
defacto state until the able political leadership of H.E Mahinda Rajapaksa and
the administrative leadership of Secretary Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa had
decided to wipe out the LTTE from the face of the Earth.
4. In the
war of liberation the Armed Forces had made tremendous sacrifices. The
casualties suffered by the Army alone would reveal the scene from July 2006
(Mavi Aru) to May 2009 (Nanthi Kadal) 5275 were KIA, 28,189 were WIA, and 140
were MIA. This is for the whole operation. In nearly two and a half years the
Army captured 13,787 sq km, traversing 97km West to East and 93 km South to
North. During the period March to May 2009, the final phase, Army
casualties were 1128 KIA, 6166 WIA and 10 MIA. In brief,
almost one-fourth of the Army losses that occurred during the entire two and a
half year operation were sustained in the final stages.
5. Even
prior to the LLRC Report the Army had initiated a complete re-evaluation of our
doctrines, tactics and administrative aspects and it will definitely take
cognizance of the recommendations made by LLRC Report and will initiate the
necessary command and administrative measures that are required to implement
them.
RECOMMENDED
ACTION PLAN BY THE ARMY BOARD
1. To
appoint various Army and Tri Service Boards that have been referred to in
chapters 1, 2 and 3 with regard to formulation of new Doctrines for MOUT/FIBUA
environments.
2. To
appoint an Army Board of Inquiry that has been referred to in Chapter 1 to
investigate the Channel 4 video footages.
3. To
appoint a Tri Service Legal Officers Board to formulate new principles and ROEs
for Internal war situation.
4. To
appoint Army and Tri Service Boards to formulate new Doctrines on various
aspects that are referred to in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4.
5. To
appoint a Tri Service Board to examine the existing HSZs/ lands occupied by
Armed Forces as referred to in the Chapter 3 and make recommendations.
6. To
establish a Directorate of Veteran Affairs at the AHQ. A Board to be appointed
to submit its proposals outlining the role, tasks etc of this Directorate.
7. To
implement all recommendations that have been made in previous Chapters.
(Ends)
